The pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of managers of closed-end funds is explicitly specified in their contracts as the marginal rate of the funds' net asset value. Using a sample of US closed-end funds from 2006 to 2009, this paper investigates the relationship between the PPS and risk-taking behaviors of fund managers. After controlling for endogeneity, we find that fund return volatility and fund PPS positively determine each other. Furthermore, the positive relationship is more pronounced for closed-end funds engaging in alternative investments or in emerging markets.
Introduction
According to Morningstar's fund database, more than 2,700 closed-end funds were listed by the end of June 2010, amounting to more than $800 billion. Over all the years in our sample, the average management compensation for a closed-end fund is $3.72 million. The management compensation for a closed-end fund is usually specified either as a single percentage of the underlying net asset value (NAV) c or as multiple marginal rates applied to different bands of the underlying NAV. d Despite its importance, significant size and unique institutional features, the managerial incentive compensation of closed-end funds remains under-researched. This paper sheds light on the issue by investigating the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) in the management contract, and risk-taking behavior, for the closed-end fund industry.
Performance-related pay is viewed as incentive compensation designed to resolve the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. CEO compensation at conventional firms normally includes a fixed salary plus stock options. Gillan, Hartzell and Parrino (2009) suggest that the overall CEO compensation structure for firms in the S&P 500 is not specified in the contract for the entire life of the firm. Therefore, previous literature on conventional firms normally estimates PPS using linear regressions on the actual ex post c The typical management contract for a closed-end fund with a single marginal compensation rate is as follows: "The fund will pay a management fee at an annual rate of 0.75% of the fund's average weekly net assets, calculated weekly and payable on the first business day of each month". In this paper, we use the fixed annual rate as the applicable marginal compensation rate (fund PPS), instead of using the fixed rate multiplied by the average of weekly net asset values. d The typical management contract for a closed-end fund with multiple marginal compensation rates is as follows: "The fund will pay a management fee at the annual rate of 0.65% of the fund's average weekly managed assets for up to $200 million, 0.60% of managed assets between $200 million and $500 million and 0.55% for managed assets in excess of $500 million, calculated weekly and payable on the first business day of each month". In this paper, we use the fixed annual rate that applies to the actual NAV in that year as the applicable marginal compensation rate (fund PPS), instead of using the fixed rate multiplied by the average of weekly net asset values. compensation provided to the CEO and other executive directors (see Jensen and Murphy 1990; Hall and Liebman 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick 2002; Jin 2002; Dee, Lulseged and Nowlin 2005) . By contrast, the compensation paid to the fund manager of a closed-end fund is explicitly specified in the management contract, which is renewed each year at the annual general meeting. Although an open-ended mutual fund has a similar management compensation structure, its fund size varies not only with the fund performance but also with the continuous new issues and redemptions of outstanding shares. The applicable marginal compensation rate (percentage-of-assets) in the management contract is not an appropriate proxy for a mutual fund's PPS. In comparison, the number of outstanding shares in a closed-end fund are no rmally fixed after the IPO. The change in the underlying NAV of a closed-end fund mainly results from its investment performance, rather than from new investments or the redeeming of shares. Accordingly, the applicable marginal compensation rate defined in the management contract is the most appropriate proxy of the fund manager 's PPS for a closed-end fund (see Coles, Suay and Woodbury 2000; Deli 2002 ). Consequently, the closed-end fund industry provides a useful experimental environment in which to use the applicable marginal compensation rate in the management contract as a good proxy for the fund PPS.
The relation between risk-taking and managerial incentives is of primary importance, because an efficient management compensation contract should make a trade-off between the correct managerial incentives (PPS) and the optimal amount of risk sharing by executives (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) . Smith and Stulz (1985) assume that the utility function of risk-averse executives is a concave function of the expected wealth, and that shareholders utilize the compensation structure to change the risk tolerance of executives. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on whether and how a fund's PPS and its risk-taking behavior determine each other in the closed-end fund industry.
In this study, we examine the full sample of 2,351 fund-year observations for US closed-end funds traded at any time between 2006 and 2009. In the sample, 19.1% of funds invest in alternative assets, and 5.9% invest in emerging markets; 33.8% of fund-years have multiple marginal rates (concave contracts), while 66.2% of fund-years have a single marginal rate (linear contracts). For a fund with multiple marginal rates in the contract, the PPS is the marginal rate that applies to the actual NAV in that year. A fund's investment risk is measured by its NAV return volatility.
To account for the endogenous relationship between fund risk-taking behavior and fund PPS, we apply simultaneous equation models to investigate how these two factors are jointly determined. We find that fund risk has a significantly positive impact on fund PPS, which confirms the prediction of the managerial ownership model but is contrary to the implications of the standard principal-agent model. Also, fund PPS imposes a significantly positive effect on the level of fund risk, which proves that, in the closed-end fund industry, out of the two incentives provided by PPS, the increase in the value of the fund manager's portfolio outweighs the negative effect of increased volatility on the manager's expected utility.
Moreover, the positive relationship between fund return volatility and fund PPS is stronger for closed-end funds that make alternative investments or invest in emerging markets.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it contributes to the work of fund compensation such as Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000) and Deli (2002) .
Second, it adds to the work done on the risk-taking of funds, by researchers such as Buraschi, Kosowski and Sritrakul (2014) . Third, it extends the study of closed-end fund investing in alternative assets and in emerging markets, adding to work done by Bekaert and Urias (1996) .
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the previo us literature and develops hypotheses. We introduce the data and methodology in Section 3. In Section 4, we report and discuss the empirical results. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 5.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Closed-end funds are managed by external management companies, implying that the delegated decision rights may cause conflicts of interest between fund managers and fund shareholders, leading to the classic principal-agent problem. As is generally indicated in the principal-agent literature, the primary means to ensure that managers take actions to maximize the returns to shareholders is to tie their compensation to the performance of their firms. As described in the introduction of this paper, the PPS of a closed-end fund is the applicable marginal compensation rate, which is a percentage of the underlying NAV, specified in the management contract each year. In rare cases, closed-end funds compensate fund managers with a proportion of the excess performance over a specified benchmark. As argued in the theoretical analysis of Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) , benchmark-adjusted performance compensation is not optimal in terms of incentive alignment and efficient risk sharing. Deli (2002) suggests that percentage-of-assets contracts are the norm in the closed-end fund industry.
The Effect of Risk on Fund Pay-Performance Sensitivity
The primary assumption of principal-agent theory is that incentives are necessary to induce costly efforts from agents in situations with information asymmetry (see Mirrless 1974 Mirrless , 1976 Ross 1973; Shavell 1979) . Accordingly, an efficient management compensation contract should make a trade-off between the correct managerial incentives (PPS) to ensure the agent's unobservable effort and the optimal amount of risk sharing by the agent, as derived in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . They predict that a risk-averse manager is more likely to make their compensation less sensitive to the performance of a firm with higher risk.
Moreover, as indicated in Stiglitz (1987) and Eisenhardt (1989) , the basic risk aversion assumption in agency theory is that agents do not like variability or risk in their compensation. Accordingly, Bloom and Milkovich (1998) suggest that a greater amount of firm risk may be transferred to the agents by reducing their income and employment stability. They argue that when firm risk is higher, greater PPS may become dysfunctional in terms of directing managers' behavior because it will just impose more risk. Therefore, similarly to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , they expect that a risk-averse manager 's PPS should be a decreasing function of the firm risk or the variance of firm performance.
Other papers have confirmed this prediction, mainly using data on conventional US firms (for example, Lambert and Larcker 1987; Kimmel, Kren and Schadewald 1995; Samwick 1999, 2002; Jin 2002; Miller, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 2002) . Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) only emphasize the assumption of the risk-aversion of managers. However, uninformed shareholders can only observe the selected projects rather than the reasons motivating managers' selections. This information asymmetry is more severe in riskier firms and can induce an adverse selection problem. To motivate risk-averse managers to select investment projects optimally (rather than excessively favoring low-risk projects), shareholders need to provide greater compensation incentives (higher PPS) to the managers of riskier firms.
Following this rationale, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) extend standard agency theory to derive a managerial ownership model and predict a positive effect of firm risk on PPS. This is supported by Prendergast (2000 Prendergast ( , 2002 and evidence from Guay (1999, 2002) . Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) also find that stock-return volatility has a positive effect on firm PPS. This prediction is also confirmed by the evidence from emerging markets gathered in Huang, Wu and Liao (2013) , which studies the relationship between equity-based compensation and managerial risk-taking in Chinese listed firms.
Similarly, Deli (2002) points out that it is optimal for the management contract to provide a larger applicable marginal compensation rate when it is more difficult to monitor the fund manager's actions or the fund's performance. Generally, the difficulty of monitoring fund performance is captured by a fund's total investment risk.
To summarize, on the one hand, if standard agency theory applies to the closed-end fund industry, then a corresponding null hypothesis is that the fund manager of a closed-end fund with higher risk is awarded a lower marginal compensation rate (PPS) in the management contract. On the other hand, according to the prediction of the managerial ownership model, a closed-end fund's marginal compensation rate is expected to be in line with its total risk. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: The fund manager of a closed-end fund with higher risk is awarded a greater marginal compensation rate (PPS) in the management contract.
The Effect of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Fund Risk
The evidence on how increased PPS affects managerial risk-taking incentives for conventional firms is inconclusive, probably because of the mixed incentives provided by PPS. As a consequence, the impact of PPS on firm risk-taking behavior seems to depend on which incentive provided by the PPS dominates (see Low 2009 ).
On the one hand, increased PPS increases the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, because they share the losses and gains (see Jensen and Meckling 1976) .
Higher PPS should therefore increase managers' efforts and lead to better performance. At the same time, John and John (1993) suggest that if higher NPV projects tend to be relatively more risky, increased PPS may motivate managers to implement riskier projects. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) show that fund managers who hedge their incentive fees try to maximize the value of the fees by increasing fund leverage as much as possible. A considerable body of theory posits that equity-based compensation is awarded to managers to overcome managerial risk aversion and encourage them to invest in high-risk, high-return projects on behalf of risk-neutral shareholders (see for example Haugen and Senbet 1981; Smith and Stulz 1985; Lambert 1986; Copeland and Weston 1988; Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia 1991; Hirshleifer and Suh 1992; Murphy 1999; Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia 1999) . In their empirical study, Massa and Patgiri (2009) find that the incentives contained in contracts have a positive effect on fund risk-taking in the mutual fund industry.
On the other hand, as indicated in Low (2009) , increased PPS exposes managers to greater firm risk, aggravating the risk aversion problem. Higher PPS leads to a greater reduction in a manager's portfolio value if the firm's stock price falls. In fact, increased firm risk increases the volatility of the manager 's total firm-specific wealth, which includes her portfolio of stocks and stock options, firm-specific human capital (see Amihud and Lev 1981; Smith and Stulz 1985) , and perquisite consumption (see Williams 1987) . Similarly, Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) show that equity-based compensation does not necessarily lead to increased risk-taking because it can increase the sensitivity of the manager's portfolio to firm stock price movement. Moreover, Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) show that although equity-based compensation can encourage managers to work hard, it can also affect their attitude toward project risk and may lead to too little risk-taking. In empirical research, Lewellen (2006) finds that a higher degree of option ownership tends to decrease managers' preference for debt financing. Gormley, Matsa and Milbourn (2010) find evidence that managers whose compensation contracts have a high sensitivity to stock price appear to reduce their risk-taking in response to the exogenous increase in downside risk. Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009) investigate the risk-taking behavior of mutual funds and find that when employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with poor mid-year performance tend to decrease risk to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives dominate, and fund managers with poor mid-year performance increase risk to catch up with the mid-year winners.
To a fund manager, if the negative incentive from PPS (higher PPS would increase the volatility of her expected utility) outweighs the positive incentive from PPS (higher PPS would increase the value of her portfolio of stocks and stock options), a higher marginal compensation rate (PPS) is predicted to make the fund manager take a lower level of investment risk. However, if the positive incentive from PPS (higher PPS would increase the value of her portfolio of stocks and stock options) dominates, then the impact of the PPS specified in the management contract on the level of risk-taking in the closed-end fund industry is predicted in the following hypothesis:
H2: A higher marginal compensation rate (PPS) specified in the management contract motivates fund managers to take a higher level of investment risk.
Investing in alternative assets or emerging markets will increase the investment risk of closed-end funds (see Bekaert and Urias, 1996) , and increased investment risk will strengthen the relationship between PPS and fund risk. Therefore, we expect that
H3: For closed-end funds investing in alternative assets or emerging markets, the relationship between PPS and fund risk is intensified.

The Endogenous Relationship
From Hypotheses 1 and 2, it can be seen that a closed-end fund's PPS included in the management contract and its risk-taking behavior seem to be interrelated, or there is an endogenous relationship between these two factors. Low (2009) indicates that empirical evidence on the effect of equity-based incentives on managerial risk-taking is inconclusive mainly because endogeneity issues often cloud the interpretation of the relation between equity-based incentives and firm risk. The endogenous relationships that emerge among governance mechanisms and managerial decisions in the extant literature are normally addressed through simultaneous equation models. For instance, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) examine how managerial incentives and investment and financial policies are jointly determined. Billett, King and Mauer (2007) investigate the endogeneity between leverage and bondholder governance represented by debt covenants. John, Litov and Yeung (2008) and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2009) examine the interactive relationship between management entrenchment and investment policy. John and Litov (2009) study the endogeneity between managerial entrenchment and leverage. King and Wen (2011) test the interactive relationship between shareholder governance, bondholder governance and mana gerial investment policy.
Thus, in order to avoid spurious inferences and to isolate causation, the empirical design of this paper needs to disentangle how fund PPS affects risk-taking behavior from how fund risk affects the fund PPS specified in the management contract each year. Therefore, a critical part of this paper involves accounting for how fund PPS and fund risk-taking behavior are jointly determined, which is achieved with simultaneous equation models.
In addition, in the previous literature, conclusions regarding the risk-taking incentives linked to equity-based compensation are often inferred through financial decisions and investment policies, instead of firm risk itself. Low (2009) discusses how such financial and investment policies often affect managerial incentives in complicated ways, making it difficult for researchers to interpret results solely in terms of risk considerations. Therefore, in this paper, we examine fund risk directly to summarize the net effect of all managerial risk-taking activities, including some that cannot easily be measured by the econometrician, so as to provide a more accurate portrayal of fund managers' risk-taking behavior. Morningstar's fund database. The data include the applicable marginal compensation rate (PPS) and the type of management contract (single or multiple compensation rates) for each fund in each sample year, the monthly NAV returns over each sample year and the previous year, the value of the total expenses of each fund during each sample year, the monthly NAV of each fund during each sample year, the value of the sales and purchases of underlying investments by each fund in each sample year, and the IPO date and investment policy of each fund.
Simultaneous Analysis of the Relationship
A closed-end fund's PPS as specified in the management contract, and its risk-taking behavior, seem to be interrelated. Following the lead of the previous literature illustrated in Section 2.3, it is critical to account for the endogenous relationship between these two factors by applying simultaneous equation models to investigate how they are jointly determined.
We estimate the system simultaneously using the instrumental variables approach. The structural set-up is described in equations (1) and (2) below: 
where i represents the fund. The dependent variable is the applicable marginal compensation rate (PPS) of the fund during each sample year. For a linear contract, the PPS is the single compensation rate specified in the contract each year, expressed as a percentage. For a concave contract, Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000) state that although different marginal rates of compensation apply to different levels of NAV, only one such rate is particularly relevant, and it is defined as the applicable marginal compensation rate. This applicable marginal compensation rate is the compensation rate specified in the contract that corresponds to the interval NAV that equals the most recent year-end NAV as reported in either the proxy statement or the annual report for the corresponding year, expressed as a percentage. They argue that, as a practical matter, this applicable marginal compensation rate is a good measure of PPS, which is the percentage of a relatively "small" change in NAV that will be captured or lost by the fund manager. To test the first hypothesis, we measure the total investment risk of the fund, using the standard deviation of the monthly NAV returns over the sample year, expressed as a percentage. To test Hypothesis 3, we control for interaction terms of investment risk with both an alternative dummy and an emerging dummy. The alternative dummy equals one if the closed-end fund invests in alternative assets, and zero otherwise.
The emerging dummy equals one if the closed-end fund invests in emerging markets, and zero otherwise.
We also control for other factors that may affect the fund's applicable marginal compensation rate. Specifically, different contract types may have different levels of applicable marginal compensation rates. The linear contract dummy is set to one if the management contract contains a single marginal compensation rate and zero if it contains a series of marginal compensation rates, declining as the fund size increases. Coles et al. (2000) suggest that higher costs may reflect higher management quality or that more effort is required to collect the information needed to make value-increasing portfolio decisions. Accordingly, fund expenses are predicted to be positively related to the fund's applicable marginal compensation rate (or, equally, to the PPS). We measure fund expenses by the expense ratio, which is total expenses as a percentage of average NAV during the sample year. Deli (2002) states that, in addition to aligning the interests of the fund manager and the shareholders, marginal compensation rates are used as a mechanism for signaling the fund manager's marginal product. He implies that the level of portfolio trading activity is positively related to the quality of management information and therefore directly related to the marginal product of the fund manager. As a consequence, the marginal compensation rates for funds with higher turnover are expected to be greater than those for funds with lower turnover (see Coles et al. 2000; Deli 2002; Cashman 2010) . The turnover ratio is the absolute value of the difference between sales and purchases of underlying investments by the fund, as a percentage of average NAV during the sample year. Deli (2002) implies that the negative relationship between fund size and fund PPS is consistent with economies of scale being passed along to investors, while a reduction in the management's marginal product is proven by Cashman (2010) to make PPS an inverse function of fund size. We measure fund size by Lnsize, which is the logarithm of the average monthly NAV of the fund during the sample year. Coles et al. (2000) argue that new funds are expected to attract more attention and effort from managers, leading to a higher marginal product and therefore greater marginal compensation rates than old funds. Accordingly, we control for a fund age variable that equals the number of trading days between the end of the sample year and the fund IPO date, divided by 250
(the approximate number of trading days in one year). Kini and Williams (2012) argue that each industry may set a standard compensation structure for all firms in that industry. They find that the industry-median CEO PPS positively affects the CEO PPS of individual firms. Accordingly, in this study, the segment-median PPS (which is defined below) is predicted to be positively related to the fund PPS. The segment-median PPS is the median manager's applicable marginal compensation rate for all funds in the same segment (foreign bond sector, foreign equity sector, domestic equity sector or domestic bond sector) during each sample year. three segment dummy variables -for the foreign bond sector, the domestic equity sector and the domestic bond sector -to control for different fund investment policies, using investments in foreign equity securities as the base to avoid multicollinearity. Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables used in the analyses.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The independent variable of predicted fund return volatility is computed by estimating a first-stage regression in which fund return volatility is the dependent variable and the independent variables include all the exogenous variables from the second-stage fund PPS regression and the chosen instrument. The predicted value of fund return volatility is then employed as an independent variable in lieu of its actual value in the second-stage regression.
Here, the chosen instrument is the segment-median fund return volatility, which is the median standard deviation of monthly NAV returns across all funds in the same segment over the sample year in question, expressed as a percentage. Roberts and Whited (2011) suggest that the most important characteristic for a valid instrument is that it will affect the second-stage variable only through its effect on the first-stage endogenous variable, based purely on economic arguments. Accordingly, we believe that the segment-median fund return volatility is a valid instrument because the segment may set a standard for the return volatility of any fund in that segment (with the same type of investment policy). At the same time, it is unlikely that this segment-level instrument will have a direct impact on fund PPS after adjusting for segment and year effects. Moreover, this segment-median return volatility is not predicted to be affected by any individual fund's decisions and, therefore, it is more likely to be orthogonal to the residuals of the second-stage regression than any of the fund-level instruments. Despite these arguments, we still examine the validity of the instrument using an F-test to ensure that the F-statistic associated with the endogenous variable in the first-stage regression is statistically significant. 
Fund return volatility
where the dependent variable is the standard deviation of monthly NAV returns over each sample year, as a percentage. To test Hypothesis 2, we control for other factors that may influence the fund return volatility. Massa and Patgiri (2009) find that mutual fund return volatility is positively affected by lagged fund return volatility, fund expenses, turnover ratio and fund size. They find that fund age has a mixed effect on return volatility. Mutual funds with linear contracts are shown to be more likely to have higher fund return volatility than mutual funds with concave contracts. As discussed above, the segment-median fund return volatility is predicted to set the standard for the return volatility of any given fund in the same segment and, therefore, is expected to be positively related to fund return volatility. Finally, we include both year and segment dummies as in equation (1). To test Hypothesis 3, we also control for interaction terms of fund PPS with both an alternative dummy and an emerging dummy. All control variables are defined as above.
In this model, fund PPS is first regressed against all the exogenous variables in the system and the instrument, and then the predicted values are computed. The instrument used is the segment-median PPS and which were shown previously to pass all the relevance and validity conditions for such instrument. Next, fund return volatility is regressed against both the predicted fund PPS and the other control variables, as in equation (2). Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for the measure of fund PPS. The mean and median applicable marginal compensation rates show that the management contracts of US closed-end funds specify average and median annual rates of 0.684% and 0.65% of the corresponding underlying NAV as the compensation for fund managers. This implies that a $1,000 increase in the fund's NAV will increase the fund manager's compensatio n by $6.84 on average, with a median increase of $6.5. These numbers are higher than the $5.46 mean and $5 median found by Coles et al. (2000) , which are also related to US closed-end funds but are based on earlier data covering the period from 1978 to 1991. The results found here are similar, though, to the estimate of CEO PPS of $6.59 found by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) for large US public companies, using data for the period from 1993 to 1996. In the present study, the maximum PPS found was $18.6 for the Taiwan Greater China fund, which invests most of its assets in the equity securities of foreign companies. for two subsamples based on PPS (those funds with below and above the median fund PPS, respectively). The tests show that the mean PPS of the sample with fund return volatility below the median is significantly smaller than that of the above-median-volatility sample, at a 1% significance level. Therefore, fund PPS seems to be positively affected by fund return volatility, which supports Hypothesis 1. The mean fund return volatility of the sample with PPS below the median is also significantly lower than that of the above-median-PPS sample, at a 5% significance level. This finding apparently confirms Hypothesis 2 -that fund PPS has a positive effect on fund risk. The univariate tests consider each of the variables independently. However, the influences on both fund PPS and fund risk are very likely to be simultaneously related to all of the other control variables. It is therefore difficult to fully examine the hypotheses through univariate analysis alone.
Empirical Findings
Descriptive Statistics
[Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables employed in the multivariate analysis. The correlations between segment-median PPS and fund PPS, between alternative dummy*PPS and segment-median PPS, between emerging dummy*PPS and segment-median PPS, and between segment-median PPS and segment-median fund return volatility are significantly high, but in each of these pairs the two variables are not tested in the same regression. All correlations between pairs of variables used in the same regression are below 0.3. This means that the detection tolerance of each pair of variables used in the same regression is larger than 0.7 and the variation inflation factor (VIF) of each pair is smaller than 1.429. O'Brien (2007) proves that a tolerance of less than 0.2 and/or a VIF of five or more indicates a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, there seem to be no multicollinearity problems for any of the independent variables used in the same regression in this study. The empirical results of the multivariate analyses are discussed in the following subsection.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Simultaneous Equation
As discussed in the literature review and methodology sections, it is critical to account for the endogenous relationship between fund PPS and fund risk by applying simultaneous equation models to investigate how they affect one another. Table 4 shows the results of the simultaneous equation models that jointly examine the determinants of fund PPS and the level of fund risk for the full sample of 2,351 fund-year observations. We report both the coefficients and the significance levels for all variables. For the simultaneous examinations, we use contemporaneous values for fund return volatility, fund PPS and all the control variables. The two models in the table are estimated simultaneously using the instrumental variables approach, following equations (1) and (2).
The predicted values of fund PPS and fund return volatility are computed by regressing against all the exogenous variables in the system and their instruments. The instrument al variables are the segment-median PPS for fund PPS and the segment-median return volatility for fund return volatility.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
In the simultaneous equations system, predicted fund PPS has a significantly positive effect on fund return volatility. A 1% increase in PPS would increase fund return volatility by 5.239% (8.834% of its standard deviation). This further confirms Hypothesis 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, this enhance would increase to 12.607% for funds investing in alternative assets, to 11.607% for funds investing in emerging markets, and to 18.975% for funds investing in alternative assets in emerging markets. Predicted fund return volatility has a positive impact on fund PPS, and fund PPS would increase by 0.012% (4.33% of its standard deviation) with a 1% increase in fund return volatility. This result therefore supports Hypothesis 1. A 1% increase in fund return volatility would increase the fund PPS by 0.014%
(5.05% of its standard deviation) for funds investing in alternative assets, by 0.013% (4.69% of its standard deviation) for funds investing in emerging markets, and by 0.015% (5.42% of its standard deviation) for funds investing in alternative assets in emerging markets. Again, this result supports Hypothesis 3. In addition, a 1% increase in the expense ratio or turnover ratio would increase fund PPS by 0.15% (54.15% of its standard deviation) or 0.001% (0.36% of its standard deviation), respectively. A 0.1% increase in the segment-median PPS would increase fund PPS by 0.074% (26.71% of its standard deviation). A one-unit decrease in Lnsize and a one-year reduction in fund age would increase fund PPS by 0.013% (4.69% of its standard deviation) and 0.002% (0.72% of its standard deviation), respectively. To summarize, the results of the simultaneous equation models testing how the level of fund return volatility and fund PPS are jointly determined are consistent with Hypotheses 1 to 3.
Robustness checks
PPS and return volatility are determined simultaneously and are highly auto-correlated, leading to the conclusion that lagged PPS is endogenous to current return volatility (or lagged return volatility is endogenous to current PPS). This conclusion is supported by the results of the endogeneity tests on lagged fund return volatility in Model 1 of Appendix Table 1 and on lagged PPS in Model 1 of Appendix Table 2 , of the Wu-Hausman F-test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-square test. Previous literature, such as Kini and Williams (2012) , uses lagged independent variables to alleviate, but does not eliminate, issues related to endogeneity in the OLS approach. They also use both the 2SLS regression approach (lagged independent variables) and the simultaneous equation approach (contemporaneous independent variables) to better account for the endogeneity.
Following this, we also conduct 2SLS regressions as a robustness check in the appendix. The results are consistent with those from simultaneous equations. The segment-median lagged fund return volatility (median standard deviation of monthly NAV returns across all funds in the same segment over the previous sample year) is used as an instrument in Model 2 of Appendix and is statistically significant, proving that the instrument is valid. The segment-median lagged fund PPS (median applicable marginal compensation rate across all funds in the same segment during the previous sample year) is used as an instrument in Model 2 of Appendix Table 2 . The F-test statistic for the validity of the instrumental variable is 203.56 and is highly statistically significant. This proves that the instrument is valid. This study contributes to the literature on management incentives, decisions on risk-taking behavior and corporate governance as a whole. The positive effect of fund risk on fund PPS supports the predictions of the managerial ownership model in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , but is contrary to the implications of the standard principal-agent model in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) . Fund risk-taking behavior is positively affected by fund PPS, which indicates that, out of the two incentives provided by PPS, the increase in the value of a closed-end fund manager 's compensation outweighs the negative effect increased volatility has on her expected utility. Cumming et al. (2015) find that mutual fund outsourcing could have an impact on fund risk.
Specifically, they find that outsourcing advisor services is associated with both greater fund risk and risk-adjusted performance. Future research could examine the relationship between PPS and outsourcing services among mutual funds. 
Ta ble 3 Correlation matrix
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables used in the multivariate analysis. Median PPS and PPS are significantly highly correlated at 0.664. Alternative dummy*PPS and median PPS are highly correlated at 0.601. Emerging dummy*PPS and median PPS are correlated at 0.561.The correlation between median PPS and median fund return volatility is significant at 0.686. However, in none of these pairs are the two variables used in the same regression for the multivariate analysis. All other correlations are below 0.3. The detection-tolerance of every pair of variables is larger than 0.7, and the variation inflation factor (VIF) of any pair of variables is smaller than 1.429. This means there is no multicollinearity problem for any of the independent variables used in the same regression. All variables are defined in and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-squared test are used to examine the endogeneity of lagged fund return volatility. A 2SLS regression is used to address the endogeneity problem of the OLS regression. The instrument used in the 2SLS regression is segment-median lagged fund return volatility (median standard deviation of monthly NAV returns across all funds in the same segment over the previous sample year); the instrument's validity is examined using an F-test, and the results are presented in the lower part of the table.
Model 1 is based on equation (1) and Model 2 on equation (2). All variables are defined in Table 1 
